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Summary: 
Digital convergence thrusts telephony, television and the Internet into the 'triple play' 
offerings creating new forms of rivalry between cable operators and telephone 
companies. Markets participants feel compelled to enter new industries to survive 
even though their core competencies are limited to their primary market. The 
outcome of the triple play competition is likely to depend on the speed of 
development of the new technologies and the adaptation of the regulation 
environment. In the short run, telephone companies will enjoy an advantage 
attributable to switching costs. However, this advantage will erode as younger 
subscribers switch to telephony on the Internet.  
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Even though it remains true that pictures, sounds and written data eventually reach 
our brain through airwaves and electromagnetic radiation, all this information is now 
processed, stored and transmitted as digits. This digital homogeneity has recently 
facilitated important changes in the structure of the Information, Communication and 
Entertainment (ICE) industries, as well as in the R&D and marketing strategies of the 
firms in this sector.  
 
New forms of rivalry have emerged between hardware producers who would not 
have competed in the past. Mobile phone producers have entered novel fields: some 
have integrated into the handset personal digital assistants (e.g. the Sony Ericsson 
P900), music players (e.g. the Sony Ericsson W800), credit cards (e.g. the DoCoMo 
Mobile Wallet). Most handsets now have an integrated camera. Similarly, personal 
digital assistants now come with a built-in phone (e.g. Treo), gaming consoles can be 
used for voice calls (e.g. the Nokia's N-Gage), and messaging devices can include 
the telephone as a secondary component (e.g. the BlackBerry).1  
 
Alongside this mutation of hardware there has been an important change in 
"content". Digital products are now commonly tied to each other. The seller supplies 
a basket of communication services that includes telecommunications (voice and 
instant messages), television and access to the Internet. The incumbent operators of 
fixed-telephone networks such as Verizon, SBC and BellSouth in America, BT, 
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom in Europe already deliver TV programs as 
well as voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP) via high-speed DSL phone lines or fibre-
optic networks. This is only the beginning. In South Korea, TU Media tests mobile TV 
services. Nokia does the same in Europe and America. 
 
The convergence between media (mainly TV), telephone, and broadband is apparent 
to all: it has been dubbed the "triple-play"2. This convergence is a challenging topic 
for the economist because it raises unexplored issues in regard to strategic behavior 
and raises an additional slew of antitrust issues. To see why, we need only consider 
                                                 
1 Most stylized facts quoted in this paper are from The Economist: "TV on your phone" (January 13th 2005), 
"The device that ate everything?" (March 12th 2005), "The war of the wires" (July 30th 2005), "The meaning of 
free speech" (September 17th 2005), "The teachings of the Virgin" (January 21st 2006), "Old mogul, new media" 
(January 21st 2006). 
2 The name is "quadruple-play" when mobile phone is added to the bundle.  
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the following: i) lack of transparency resulting from bundling; ii) the exclusive access 
to an essential technology by dominant actors; iii) cross subsidization that 
accompanies competition between "triple players" and "single-service providers"; iv) 
bundling of services regulated by different agencies with different traditions and rules. 
This paper explores the effects of digital convergence between telephony, television 
and Internet into the “'triple play adventure”. In the first section, we set out the main 
features of the convergence between electronic services. The second section recalls 
the economic principles of tying, focusing on efficiency and antitrust consequences of 
bundling by a dominant actor. Section 3 extends the analysis to a competitive 
environment which matches more closely the rivalry between the players engaged in 
developing war in ICE industries. In section 4 we provide some examples of recent 
cases involving bundling of digital services. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Bundling ICE services 
 
The convergence of the supply of Information, Communication and Entertainment 
(ICE) has set off a battle between telecoms-firms, cable-operators and internet-
providers for the market in fixed-line telephone services. The traditional suppliers of 
telephony are facing tremendous competitive pressure from actors like Skype who 
offer voice over the Internet network (VoIP) at rock bottom prices. Concurrently, the 
telephone companies are entering the entertainment market. In the US for example, 
the second largest Baby Bell, SBC, has launched IPTV – a television channel that 
supplies content via upgraded broadband connections. Cable firms such as Comcast, 
Cablevision and others offer subscriptions to triple-play bundles. France Telecom, the 
dominant actor in French telephony now offers its 'MaLigne tv' product -a DSL line- to 
100 cities, and reaches over 20 million households.3 Its closest competitor – Free – 
currently has 159,000 subscribers to TV-over-DSL services. 
 
Traditional telecoms firms try to meet the challenge by taking over VoIP carriers and 
switching from the technology of circuit-switched networks to Internet-based 
networks. This, however, appears inadequate as a means of stopping the invasion of 
their markets by actors who use other digital technologies. It seems increasingly 
                                                 
3 The customers of the 'MaLigne tv' service purchase tickets that can then be debited for on-demand movies and 
programs. France Telecom expects to have 180,000 IPTV subscribers by the end of 2005, a tripling in one year. 
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obvious that they all will have to enter the entertainment and Internet worlds and will 
bundle all services. 
 
Traditional telecoms firms face a double challenge. The investments in fibre-optic 
lines and upgrades of standard copper wires into high-speed DSL lines are massive.4 
They must also install a 'residential gateway' in each house to connect the telephone, 
the computer and the TV set. To conquer the broadband universe, they must also 
invest in software including: compression formats, transfer protocols, compatibility 
standards, etc.  
The second challenge is to adapt the telephone culture to the entertainment world. 
As shown by Figure 1, the telephone operator is essentially a passive hub of a star 
network that connects consumers who produce content. Each telephone call is a 
specific two-way service with endogenous content and duration. The telephone 
company provides the platform, that is, it plays a mere technical role. By contrast, the 
cable firm controls a one-way mass service. It is responsible for technical quality, but 
also has to deal with content producers and to some extent determines content.5  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 A temporary measure to enter the TV business is to ally with a satellite-TV (at the moment, satellite cannot 
offer triple-play), but it can hardly solve the problem in the long run because it means to maintain and develop 
two distinct heterogeneous transmission infrastructures. In France, Wanadoo (France Telecom) offers its 
broadband subscribers a discount on contracts with the two French satellite operators (TPS and Canalsat). 
5 In North America, there is essentially vertical disintegration and the cable distributor plays a minor role in 
supplying content. There are firms which supply the channels to a cable distributor who arranges for bundling of 
channels and pricing. The firms that sell the channels to cable distributors generally acquire the content that they 
put in the channel from independent content suppliers. These firms are often paid by the cable distributors on a 
per subscriber basis. The suppliers of channels may also produce themselves some of the content that they put in 
the channel.  
telephone 
operator 
cable 
operator 
Figure 1. Two business models 
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The selection and marketing of content6 require skills that have little in common with 
expertise in the management and pricing of voice. Also, the fixed-line operators do 
not have an established relationship with content providers, which can be detrimental 
for entering TV market. The major competitive asset of the telephone companies is 
penetration rate of almost 100%. The penetration rate of Internet and pay-TV is for 
now significantly lower.7  
The next section considers the role of bundling in the competitive struggle driven by 
convergence. It examines both the pro-competitive and anti-competitive features of 
bundling.  
 
2. Tying and bundling: pro- or anti-competitive?  
 
Tying generally refers to an action whereby the sale of a product --for example toner 
cartridges-- is made conditional on the purchase from the seller of another product --
a printer. It is achieved via contract or technical compatibility. Pure bundling denotes 
the practice whereby the seller combines a fixed number of units of one product with 
a fixed number of units of one or more other products in a single package and limits 
the choice of buyers to purchase of the package or nothing at all (for example the 
week-end newspaper bundled with a magazine). By contrast, a mixed bundling 
regime allows consumers to choose between the aforementioned bundle and the 
purchase of the individual components of the bundle.8 
Tying creates long-run dependency of consumers. Bundling allows to increase short-
run revenues by imposing the sale of goods with low utility. Therefore, they should be 
clearly distinguished like they are in legal cases. Nevertheless, the strategic 
differences are less important than their common characteristics and to keep things 
as simple as possible, we will regard bundling and tying as synonymous in this 
paper.9  
                                                 
6 See Crampes and Hollander (2005). 
7 In the OECD countries, the broadband penetration rate reached 11.8 subscribers per 100 inhabitants in June 
2005. Korea is the world leader with 25.5 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. In the US, the rate is 14.5% and in 
France 12.8%. The breakdown of broadband technologies is as follows: DSL: 61.2%, cable modem: 32.0%, 
other technologies: 6.8%, (e.g. fibre optics, LAN, satellite and fixed wireless). Source www.oecd.org/statsportal. 
8 See European Commission (2005), p.54. 
9 For a comprehensive overview on bundling, see section 7 of Stole (2003). For the antitrust aspects, see Motta 
(2004).  
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During the last two decades, bundling has become a hot topic for Industrial 
Organization economists, mainly as a result of legal actions against Microsoft.10 
Historically the theoretical literature on bundling and tying has primarily considered 
two cases: i) the case of a monopolist who is not threatened by entry and uses these 
techniques as a substitute to discrimination allowing greater extraction of consumer 
surplus;11 ii) the case of an incumbent monopolist threatened by an outsider for 
whom the strategy serves as a means to foreclose entry.12 In the latter case, the 
basic economic model depicts a monopoly tying one exclusive product to some other 
product also sold by active competitors. To capture the economics of the Triple Play, 
one must look at more recent work that models bundling by several firms already 
active in separated markets and competing in the bundle extended market. This will 
be done in section 3. 
 
Bundling allows several direct gains. One possible gain derives from economies of 
scope over high-speed phone lines and economies of scale in billing and marketing. 
Bundling also expands players’ strategy space. For instance, bundling together TV, 
broadband and phone increases customer loyalty since it makes it harder to switch 
from one provider to another one. The economists have long viewed bundling as a 
potential dangerous behaviour for competition --the so-called “leverage theory”-- … 
except that the only theoretical works available, most of them from the University of 
Chicago, tended to prove its harmlessness.13 The leverage theory of bundling holds 
that a firm with monopoly power in market A can restrict competitors’ sales in market 
B. The objection by Chicago economists was that in a competitive market for good B, 
monopoly A could attract consumers only by fixing a price below marginal cost, which 
is not profitable. Therefore, they considered that bundling should not be suspected of 
having an exclusionary purpose. Whinston (1990) has shown that if one relaxes the 
assumption that market B is competitive and that production takes place under 
                                                 
10 Many economists consider that bundling has been the main driver for the development of Microsoft, long 
before the Explorer and Media Player cases. For example, Nalebuff (2000) writes: " ... a firm that creates or 
simply aggregates a bundle of complementary software applications would have a substantial pricing advantage 
over its rivals and thereby achieve a leadership position in the market. This is especially true as the bundle grows 
in scale. Thus, Microsoft’s taking the lead in creating a software application bundle — putting together word-
processing, spreadsheet, presentation, HTML editing, and email applications — may help explain the stunning 
market success of Microsoft Office suite."  
11 See for instance Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). 
12 See Rey and Tirole (2005). 
13 See for example Posner (1976). 
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constant returns to scale, the monopoly in A can benefit from the exclusion of 
competitors in market B. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there can never be 
an efficiency gain from tying, and from the triple play offer in particular. We examine 
the efficiency gains in subsection 2.1. In subsection 2.2 we discuss the profit 
incentive for bundling and its anticompetitive consequences. 
 
2.1. The social gains from bundling 
 
When the goods within the bundle encompass economies of scope and/or when they 
are always consumed jointly by the buyers, it can be welfare increasing to have one 
single producer and seller. Bundling may allow a saving in production, selling and 
administration costs (on the supply side) and transaction costs (on the demand side). 
It may also give the buyer the assurance that the different products in the bundle 
meet a certain quality standard. This may be of great importance when the 
components of the bundle work together as a system.14 With regard to transaction 
costs, it is true that buying from different suppliers may be time consuming, for 
example because the consumer needs to find technical information about 
compatibility. Consequently, bundling two goods or services may give consumers a 
higher net utility than if they have to buy them separately, either because the gross 
utility of joint consumption is higher than the sum of the separated gross utilities, or 
because the bundle is produced at a lower cost than if the elements were produced 
separately so that the price is lower.  
 
In the triple play case, one can discard the argument of utility super-additivity. In fact, 
telephone, broadband access and TV are available from a variety of suppliers and 
there is little evidence that a bundle would decrease subscribers’ costs. In other 
words, even if the services were complements for the consumer, there is no reason 
to purchase from a single supplier. Also, due to the digital nature of the products, one 
can think that the transaction cost argument is not essential, even though it can be 
decisive at the margin, for example because households prefer to receive one single 
                                                 
14 However, efficiency gains from joint consumption can also arise from the products supplied by competitors. In 
particular, when the bundle is made of complementary goods or services, it does not necessarily entail that the 
buyers would benefit a lower utility buying the parts from independent sellers. However, the bundle is better if 
the exclusive producer of one of the goods has made it incompatible with the other goods when they are 
produced by a competitor --for example when toner cartridges sold by firm A exclusively work with the printers 
of firm A. 
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bill and to call always the same hotline when one of the services they have 
subscribed to does not work as expected. Obviously, this type of consumer's gain is 
claimed by the bundlers but the evidence is lacking. 
 
The strongest efficiency argument in favor of triple play is based on the existence of 
economies of scope in supply. On the transmission side, digitalization has made 
sounds, pictures and data perfect substitutes that can be injected into the “electronic 
pipes”. Therefore, ownership of the physical network that can carry any audio and 
video signals argues against specialization. This "common pipe" argument means 
that the operators of all types of e-nets have good reason to make their pipes 
accessible to all content providers. Even though digitalization has opened the door to 
both vertical bundling (access to the pipe + supply of content) and horizontal bundling 
(several types of contents), economies of scope do not necessarily apply to vertical 
bundling. In fact, things are more complex for service production and consumption 
outside of the telephone or cable network, both upstream and downstream. At the 
downstream level, consumers still need distinct electronic appliances to receive and 
process the digits. Using a non-adapted receiver, chances are that the pink elephant 
sent by the TV operator will look like a green donkey on the phone's screen if not like 
a boring list of 0s and 1s on the computer's screen. Nevertheless, given the past 
trend, one can rationally expect quick technological progress in this field so that, in a 
near future, households will have at their disposal standardized "compuTV sets" that 
will allow them to switch from one service to another by touching the screen or the 
keyboard. 
The main efficiency argument against triple play is upstream, at the stage of content 
production. The failure of Time Warner-AOL and Vivendi-Universal illustrates well the 
fact that the skills required to succeed in each of the three activities are very different.  
As indicated in section 1 consumers provide the content in the case of telephone. 
Like in a marketplace15, the operator’s roles are strictly technical: to ease the search 
of the person with whom the caller wants to speak and allow a high quality of secured 
connection without interfering on content between the agents who want to exchange 
voice or text. The Internet services are quite different. Except for chat-rooms and 
blogs, there is a clear separation between the providers of services (news, financial 
                                                 
15 The similarity between operating a telephone network and operating a market place explains the recent 
takeover of Ebay on Skype, the leader in VoIP, for a stake of some 3b€. 
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data, travels, real estate, as well as Video-on-Demand and Music-on-Demand) and 
the consumers of services. And, there is no complementarity of skills between the 
publication of weather forecasts and the supply of music catalogues. As for the 
broadcast of TV programs, it is a product with mass appeal where viewers can pick 
and choose. It is neither the consumption of a two-way service like for telephone, nor 
an individual choice among millions of products like for Internet. It is the supply of 
differentiated programs among which each of the thousands of viewers select the 
one he/she prefers. Therefore the safety, quality and regulatory requirements are not 
the same for telephone, internet services and TV programs and the business models 
are quite different. 
 
Budget-balancing can be an argument in favor of bundling ICE services. In spite of its 
apparently anticompetitive effects, customer loyalty can be necessary for the 
operators to break even. In fact, infrastructure costs and media production costs are 
very high; conversely, variable cost per head is lower and keeps decreasing. It might 
well be that competition prevents telecom and cable firms to recoup their fixed costs 
when consumers only subscribe to one or two services. In that case, if a consumer 
with the gateway box of operator A in his basement, only pays A for the web 
connection and subscribes to operators B and/or C for TV and telephone, the 
revenue of A may be too low to compensate its cost. One strategy for A could be to 
use its gateway technology to blockade or to damage the services provided by its 
competitors, so that consumers have no other choice than subscribing to A's bundle, 
with the effect of balancing the infrastructure budget. If quality is not observable, A 
can allege that the low quality of the competitors' service is due to exogenous 
reasons (virus, incompatibility, etc.). This problem is not different from the one of long 
distance telephone operators asking for access to the local loop (see Rey and Tirole, 
2005).  
 
To sum up, there is little evidence of an increase in efficiency due to triple play. In 
particular, the economies of scope in the joint supply of TV, phone and Internet are 
rather low. The argument that tying is necessary to raise revenues enough to recoup 
the infrastructure costs is dubious because i) the three services have been developed 
in the past without being bundled and ii) revenues can be raised by the 
infrastructure's owner opening access to his essential facility. On pure efficiency 
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grounds, the main social benefit of triple play could derive from enhanced 
competition. But as shown in the next section, the main driver of bundling is to limit 
competition and to conquer adjacent markets. 
 
2.2. The private gains from bundling 
  
The alternative argument for bundling is that it allows sellers to capture greater 
monopoly rents at the expense of consumers by engaging in price discrimination and 
by blocking access to entrants who only supply one product.16 We first consider the 
case of a firm whish is a monopolist both in markets A and B. Then we suppose that 
the monopolist in A faces competitors in B. 
 
Price discrimination 
When a firm faces very heterogeneous consumers, it would like to propose them very 
different prices in order to appropriate their surplus. But price discrimination may be 
prohibited by law or be contingent on the availability of information about consumers' 
willingness to pay, that is too costly to acquire. If the only feasible solution is uniform 
pricing, the seller abandons some surplus to the consumers with the highest 
willingness-to-pay and, additionally, does not supply all consumers with a reservation 
value higher than marginal cost. Bundling is an alternative way to price discriminate 
as the following elementary example shows. 
A monopoly sells two goods A and B to two consumers i and j. The willingness-to-pay 
of consumer i is 1€ for good A and 2€ for good B. The willingness-to-pay of consumer 
j is 2€ for good A and 1€ for good B. Each consumer buys at most one unit of each 
good. If discrimination is banned, (or impossible because the firm cannot identify who 
is i and who is j), the monopoly can at best earn a total profit of 4€ by fixing for each 
good either a uniform price of 1€ and selling one unit of each good to both 
consumers -who enjoy a positive net surplus- or a uniform price of 2€ and selling 
each good only to one consumer -one unit of B to i and one unit of A to j. However, 
assuming that the reservation price for the package AB is exactly equal to the sum of 
the reservation price for each good, the monopoly can easily increase its profit by 
                                                 
16 In Europe, bundling cases are treated under Article 82(d) of the EC Treaty. An abuse by a dominant firm may 
consist in “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.” 
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tying A and B and selling the package at the unit price 3€. At this price, the two 
consumers will buy the bundle and the monopoly’s profits will be 6€. Bundling 
increases the monopolist's profit by reducing the heterogeneity of consumers' 
valuations: i and j are different in terms of preferences for A and B but their 
willingness t pay for the bundle is the same.  
This reduction of consumer heterogeneity and the existence of economies of scope 
are the main reasons why there are generalist newspapers, although readers display 
a great disparity in preferences for politics, arts, sports and other topics. 
 
When preferences are not perfectly negatively correlated like in the former example, 
pure bundling does not allow to extract all the consumers' surplus. A better solution is 
mixed bundling where the firm sells separately good A at high price Ap , good B at 
high price Bp  and simultaneously offers the package AB at a price AB A Bp p p< + .17 
This form of second-order price discrimination allows the sorting of consumers: those 
with a strong preference for A (respectively B) buy A (respectively B), and the others 
with middle-range evaluations either buy the bundle or do not buy at all.  
 
Foreclosure18 
We now consider the case where the monopolist in market A faces competition in 
market B. To analyze the risk of leverage through bundling, it is necessary to assess 
the technical conditions of production and commercialization in the tied markets. In 
particular, one essential feature is the credible ability of the dominant firm to commit 
to a bundle. Absent any competitor in market A, the producer will fix the monopoly 
price, denoted by Ap . Suppose that the firm simultaneously proposes good A alone 
at the monopoly price Ap  and a bundle made of good A and good B at a price ABp . It 
is clear that consumers will buy the bundle only if the implicit price of good B, 
AB Ap p− , is not larger than the price of good B sold by competitors. This inability to 
                                                 
17 For a deeper exploration in this topic, see Mathewson and Winter (1997) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). 
18 "By foreclosure is meant that actual or potential competitors are completely or partially denied profitable 
access to a market. Foreclosure may discourage entry or expansion of rivals or encourage their exit. Foreclosure 
thus can be found even if the foreclosed rivals are not forced to exit the market: it is sufficient that the rivals are 
disadvantaged and consequently led to compete less aggressively." European Commission (2005), p.18.  
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inoculate some market power from market A into the competitive market B has been 
stressed by the Chicago School.19 
However, this is no longer true in a sequential setting where the monopoly can 
commit itself to producing only the bundle, for example by creating technical links or 
specific design: “You cannot use my VoIP service if you do not buy my Internet 
connection because I use proprietary protocols”. The exclusive sale of bundles 
makes the monopolist in market A more aggressive in market B. The argument is as 
follows: if the monopoly has committed to bundle, it must sell B to extract rents from 
A, which means the obligation to cut the implicit price of good B. The resulting lower 
equilibrium price of good B will hurt the firms that only produce good B and decrease 
their operating profits. If the resulting profit is lower than their fixed cost of entry, in 
the sub-game perfect equilibrium potential competitors stay out of market B when 
they observe that the incumbent sells a bundle. 20  
Note that this policy is also costly for the monopoly when it faces competitors already 
in the market. Bundling is profitable only when it attracts a sufficient number of 
consumers of B to compensate the loss in revenue on A. When all consumers are the 
same, the monopolist in A will tie A and B only if it drives competitors out of the 
market. When the consumers of good A have heterogeneous preferences, a 
commitment to bundling does not necessarily result in foreclosure.  
 
To sum up, it is clear that “the reason for concern about tying by a dominant firm is 
that tying serves more to hurt and eliminate rivals from the tied market than to 
enhance efficiency…” (J. Tirole, 2005, p.3). Is that true in the triple-play game where 
bundling is multilateral? 
  
                                                 
19 "If the price of the tied product is higher than the purchaser will have to pay on the open market, the difference 
will represent an increase in the price of the final product or service to him, and he will demand less of the tying 
product." (Posner 1976, p. 173).  
20 When technology does not allow to exclude competitors from the secondary market, the incumbent in the 
primary market can try to obtain legal exclusion from the secondary market, for example through a patent. But 
antitrust authorities can view it as a presumption of abuse of market power. In the Independent Ink vs. Trident 
case, Independent Ink alleged that Trident had engaged in illegal tying by conditioning the lease of Trident’s 
patented inkjet technology on the additional sale of Trident ink products. The U. S. District Court for the Central 
District of California ruled in 2002 against Independent Ink’s claim that Trident violated Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, stating that Independent Ink "failed to produce any evidence of market power over the tying 
product" (i.e., the print-head). But on January 25, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit concluded that a patent “presumptively defines the relevant market for the patented product itself, and 
creates a presumption of power within this market. Once the plaintiff establishes a patent tying agreement, it is 
the defendant’s burden to rebut the presumption of market power and consequent illegality that arises from 
patent tying.” See Hayden (2005). 
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3. The multi-play game 
 
Section 2 dealt with bundling in markets where one firm could tie its products but its 
rivals could not. By contrast, in the triple-play game several firms are attempting to 
capture market shares by bundling. To explore such competition, it is best to 
distinguish between the following cases: i) no asymmetry between rivals, and ii) initial 
asymmetry between rivals. 
 
3.1 Symmetrical bundle competition  
 
The analysis of competition between firms that offer bundles is examined in the 
framework of the so-called "mix and match" models (see Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988, 1992))21. Their model has been revisited by several authors, in particular 
Reisinger (2004) who shows that the consequences of commodity bundling are less 
predictable in the duopoly case than in the monopoly case. As pointed out earlier, 
bundling is particularly profitable for the monopoly if the preferences of consumers 
are negatively correlated because it makes the consumers more homogeneous (the 
"sorting effect") thereby facilitating the extraction of rents. However, in the duopoly 
framework, making consumers more homogeneous intensifies competition because it 
is less likely that sellers will focus on specific segments of consumers; (this additional 
effect is named the "business-stealing" effect.) This would intensify price competition 
and lower profits. Actually, as shown below, the possibility of tying creates a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation. 
Reisinger (2004) provides an extension of the Vickrey-Salop model of differentiation 
where consumers are uniformly located along two circles in order to represent their 
relative preferences for two goods. Each circle represents one market. Two firms are 
active at exogenously given locations in both markets. They simultaneously choose 
their bundling and pricing strategy. They incur identical linear independent costs 
because there is no complementarity on the supply side. Every consumer has a unit 
demand for both goods and purchases at most one unit of each good independently 
of the other good: there is no complementarity on the demand side.  
                                                 
21 Actually, in Matutes and Regibeau the problem is whether to make two products compatible. But their model, 
where consumers must choose between bying the products separately (when compatible) or from the same seller, 
can be easily interpreted in terms of bundle competition. 
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The analysis focuses on the role of correlation between the preferences for the two 
goods. Consumers’ prices for the two goods depend on their location on the circles. 
Therefore, the joint distribution function of reservation prices for the two products sold 
by each firm can be inferred from the joint distribution function of consumer locations. 
And, from the joint distribution of reservation prices one can compute the correlation 
between the reservation prices. For example if every consumer has the same 
location on both circles, then the reservation price correlation is equal to 1. The 
Reisinger's model assumes that the distance between the location on one circle and 
the location on the other circle is the same for all consumers. Specifically, the 
consumer with address x in the first market has address x+k in the second market, 
the consumer with address y in the first market has address y+k in the second 
market, and so on. This mean that the larger the distance, the smaller the correlation 
of preferences for the two goods. When k is 0, the correlation coefficient is 1. 
 
Consider first the case of consumers’ homogeneity. Homogeneity means that many 
consumers have a strong preference for both goods being sold by the same firm. 
Consequently, the firms can behave as local monopolists and can extract more 
consumers' rent with bundling. The consumers who are almost indifferent between 
the two bundles are not numerous and the firms do not compete to attract them. 
There is some business-stealing but it is unimportant compared to the sorting effect. 
The implication is that bundling increases profits.  
Assume instead that consumer preferences are heterogeneous, i.e. consumers have 
negatively correlated willingness-to-pay. Now bundling creates a strong ’business-
stealing’ effect that most likely dominates the sorting effect and makes bundling 
unprofitable.  
 
To gain intuition, assume that the two firms can sell their goods only in a bundle (pure 
bundling). The bundles are almost perfect substitutes and each firm can gain many 
new customers by lowering the price of its own bundle, that is by "stealing" them from 
the other firm. This results in harsh price competition and a decrease in profits. When 
the firms can implement mixed bundling, the same is true because the price war on 
the bundles influences the unbundled prices which are also driven down. The result 
is that profits are low and consumer rents are high.  
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We observe that in the case of heterogeneous preferences, the dupolists are in a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation. They both would be better off if they could commit not to 
bundle. But if one does, the competitor has no other choice than doing the same. 22 In 
this case, the firms would benefit from the legal interdiction of tying products.  
The model also shows that welfare is lower when the firms bundle because of 
distributive inefficiency. Since the bundle is priced below the sum of the two 
independent prices, some consumers buy the bundle. An increase in consumer 
heterogeneity increases equilibrium prices for the products sold alone and it induces 
some consumers to switch to one of the bundles. This results in distributive 
inefficiency because some of these consumers have preferences for the products 
coming from different firms. So bundling reduces social welfare since its only effect is 
to oblige some consumers to buy the wrong good.  
The model can also be used to analyze what happens when firms choose their 
location and thereby influence the correlation of reservation prices. The firms may 
choose minimal differentiation in one product and forego profits from that product and 
still differentiate themselves from their rival in regard of the other product. This averts 
price competition on the bundle. In the USA, telephone companies that sell long 
distance service and internet access in one package engage in such hybrid 
differentiation. For instance, the long distance service offers included in the bundle of 
AT&T, Birch telecom, and Verizon are very similar but each firm tries to differentiate 
itself with respect to their internet offerings. Each offers different rates and different 
installation incentives: "AT&T offers only 20 hours per month but gives a free 
installation kit and free live support. By contrast, Birch telecom offers unlimited 
access but gives only standard support and no gifts. Verizon also offers unlimited 
access and free live support but it offers no installation kit. In addition, consumers 
can choose at Verizon if they want to buy DSL or wireless where wireless is a bit 
more expensive." (Reisinger, 2004 p.25). 
 
3.2 Asymmetrical bundle competition  
 
The symmetric model cannot answer all questions raised by the triple-play game. 
The model pays no heed to the role of an installed base. The latter plays an 
                                                 
22 Vodaphone is the only large telephone company sticking to a mobile-only strategy. 
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important role by reducing the responsiveness of consumers to small price gaps. This 
remains true today, even though switching costs have declined in ICE. Also, absent 
perfect compatibility, network externalities give a strong advantage to incumbents 
since each of their subscribers benefit from the fact that there are many other 
subscribers to the same company. The marginal subscriber does not switch from one 
provider to another in response to a small price differential. The resulting viscosity 
creates a hysteresis effect. More pointedly, there are strong advantages to 
incumbency in a market because the number of customers today echoes the number 
of customers yesterday. So, to convey the essence of the triple play problem, the 
model must be adapted to the case where each firm has a relative advantage in one 
market (which cannot be the case in the circle model) before opening the game for 
entry in the other market.  
The way past outcomes impinges on actual competition in digital markets may differ 
from one firm to the other. Cable operators already have the expertise for 
programming TV content. Adding VoIP to their supply of services is not difficult task 
when broadband access is already available. But, they face two handicaps:  
i) first they are late entrants in the telephone industry and they suffer from the 
positive network externalities of their competitors. The fact is that they have 
a small number of subscribers as compared to telephone companies, and 
the connection protocols are not perfectly compatible. Consequently they 
must offer price discounts to poach clients for VoIP from telephone 
companies; 
ii) second, contrary to traditional fixed telephone, VoIP requires the home 
connection box to be permanently on, which is costly in energy for 
households.  
By contrast, telephone companies are newcomers to the entertainment industry and 
they will have to invest heavily to keep up with the cable firms in the supply of movies 
and football games, either contracting with content producers or becoming producers. 
Which entry cost is higher is hard to say because it depends on the behavior of 
consumers as well as on the development of hardware and software techniques. For 
older consumers, the incumbent telephone companies may well keep a competitive 
advantage because these consumers are less likely to switch to new and unfamiliar 
providers. But younger consumers, already familiar with mobile telephony and the 
Internet are probably easier to capture by cable operators. This means that the 
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traditional telephone companies allied with satellite operators are likely to ultimately 
lose their advantage as their loyal customers are getting older and older. 
Nevertheless, if it takes cable operators too much time to install and control the 
electronic box that connects home with the external world, they will lose the war on 
financial grounds because the population of youngsters will not be large (and rich) 
enough to compensate for the richer clients of telecom firms.  
 
4. Examples of recent cases involving bundling of digital services 
 
The business process reengineering initiated by triple play shall call for changes in 
regulation. The adaptations concern the competition authorities and the sectoral 
regulators. Hereafter are some examples of recent cases. 
 
i) bundling residential telephone and internet  
In 2000 British Telecom (BT) announced a new tariff package that bundled standard 
residential telephone service to unmetered off-peak internet access.23 The dominant 
telco launched the package in response to an offer of free Internet access by the ISP 
provider Freeserve. The offer made it possible for subscribers to get access to the 
Internet at the cost of a local phone call. The introduction of the new package by BT 
led to the initiation of an investigation by Oftel, the regulator of telecommunications. 
Oftel’s concern was that the bundle would be instrumental in extending BT’s position 
of dominance from retail voice calls into Internet services. A second concern related 
to distortion of competition in the wholesale termination of Internet calls.  
To assess the intentions of the dominant firm, the regulator examined whether the 
marginal price charged by BT for Internet access was higher than the long run 
incremental cost it incurred by offering this service. In its report, the regulator 
concluded that the available information could not support a conclusion that BT was 
offering Internet access below cost. It also found that the structure of competition in 
wholesale call termination markets did not warrant a concern for anti-competitive 
effects. It therefore concluded that the launch of the bundle did not infringe the 
Competition Act. 
 
ii) VoIP and price regulation  
                                                 
23 Our summary of this case is based on Nalebuff. and Majerus (2003) 
 18
The French regulator of telecoms has recently determined that VoIP must be 
included into the market of fixed communications. It also established that competition 
is strong enough to justify forbearance  from tariff control (ARCEP, 2005). On the 
latter, the competitors of France Telecom and the French competition authority 
strongly disagree with ARCEP (see Conseil de la concurrence, 2005). 
 
iii) triple-play via merger  
On December 30, 2005 the UK's Office of Fair Trading cleared the proposed 
acquisition of Easynet by BSkyB. The merger allows BSkyB to offer triple-play 
services. The merger had raised concerns about Sky using its power as a seller of 
premium content and a buyer of non-premium content to block the supply of pay-TV 
content to DSL rivals. The OFT found that Sky already had the potential to do this in 
the absence of a merger, and the merger does not materially alter its incentives to 
block.24 
 
iv) triple play to foster competition in telephony  
Ten years after losing its monopoly, Telmex remains in control of more than 90% of 
the Mexican voice telephone market. Mexico has about 220 cable companies. On 
July 10, 2006, the Federal Competition Commission25 issued a nonbinding document 
recommending to the Communications Ministry to allow cable operators to sell phone 
service as soon as possible, and to bar phone companies from offering television 
until they provided interconnection and number portability services to cable 
operators. The competition authority is clearly promoting an active industrial policy in 
order to adapt the new industry to its view on what competition should be and to limit 
the advantages of the incumbent. 
 
v) triple play and the merger of regulatory bodies  
Convergence at the technological and market levels has led to integration at the 
regulatory level. In the UK, Communications Act of 200326 gave Ofcom27 the authority 
to regulate communications. Ofcom combines powers previously held by five 
                                                 
24 See http://www.oft.gov.uk/News/Press+releases/2005/235-05.htm 
25 http://www.cfc.gob.mx/ 
26 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm 
27 http://www.ofcom.org.uk/ 
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regulators.28 The old regulators have been disbanded and many members of their 
staff have been transferred to Ofcom. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Bundling strategies are risky and likely profitable to firms and unprofitable to 
consumers. Will it be the same in the communication, information and entertainment 
industry where modern bundling takes the form of triple play?  
On efficiency grounds, most of the arguments that motivate bundling in a monopoly 
framework are negative: at best, it is a way to discriminate in markets where a firm 
already exerts some monopoly power, at worst it allows a firm with monopoly power 
in one market to use the leverage of this power to conquer a second market. This 
explains why courts should not view positively a regional telephone company 
unilaterally tying local phone services and DSL. Nevertheless, triple play and 
quadruple play open new perspectives. They are a reciprocal attempt of cross 
invasion of neighboring markets by firms that are well installed in their native market. 
In other words, triple-play rather looks like the unavoidable extension of competition 
due to the digitalization of pictures, sounds and data. It is unavoidable because the 
ICE firms face a prisoner's dilemma. Limiting oneself to its incumbency sector is not 
an equilibrium strategy: when the bundling strategy is adopted by one of the firms, 
the other ones have no choice but to follow. And to benefit from network externalities, 
the firms must install a large base of clients, which gives them the incentive to play 
first, thereby accelerating the transition. 
 
Because of the lack of relevant economic modeling of the phenomenon, it is hard to 
predict whether there is a risk of natural monopolization. Is there room for one single 
national champion or, on the contrary, is it time for real competition at last? 
Indications are that control of the gateway box will become essential to remain in the 
ICE markets. Based on the economic pattern of telecommunications established in 
most developed contries, one can expect that open access to the gateway box will be 
a key element of the new regulatory framework in the ICE industry.  
 
                                                 
28 Specifically the Independent Television Commission, the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Radio 
Authority, the Radio communications Agency and Oftel. 
 20
References 
ARCEP (2005) "Analyse des marchés pertinents de la téléphonie fixe", Projet de 
décision n°05-0571, Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des 
postes, Paris; www.art-telecom.fr/dossiers/marches/projet-arcep-05-0571.pdf 
Conseil de la Concurrence (2005) "Avis n° 05-A-10 du 11 mai 2005 relatif à une 
demande d’avis de l’Autorité de régulation des télécommunications en application de 
l’article L. 37-1 du code des postes et communications électroniques, portant sur 
l’analyse des marchés de la terminaison d’appels géographiques sur les réseaux 
alternatifs fixes" www.art-telecom.fr/textes/juris/05-a-10.pdf 
Bakos Y. and E. Brynjolfsson (1999) "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, 
and Efficiency", Management Science, Vol. 45, No. 12, December, pp. 1613-1630 
Crampes C. and A. Hollander (2005), "Product Specification, Multi-product Screening 
and Bundling: the Case of Pay TV" (2005), Information Economics and Policy, 17, 
35–59. 
Del Bianco M. (2004): “Antitrust issues raised by product bundling in communication 
markets”, The Antitrust Source, July, 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/DelBianco7.pdf 
European Commission (2005), "DG Competition discussion paper on the application 
of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses", December, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf 
Hayden A.K. (2005) "Patent tying agreements: presumptively illegal?", The John 
Marshall review of intellectual property law, 5:94, pp.94-119 
www.jmls.edu/ripl/vol5/issue1/hayden.pdf 
Mathewson F. and R. A. Winter (1997): "Tying as a Response to Demand 
Uncertainty", Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn, Volume 28, No. 3 : pp. 566-583 
Matutes, C. and P. Regibeau, (1988), "Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without 
Network Externalities," Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 19 (2), pp. 219-234. 
Matutes C. and P. Regibeau, (1992): "Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary 
Goods in Duopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 37-54. 
Motta, M. (2004): “Competition policy. Theory and Practice”, Cambridge University 
Press 
Nalebuff B. (2000): "Competing against bundles", WP7, Yale School of Management  
Nalebuff, B. (2003) "Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects. Part 1 – Conceptual 
issues", February, DTI Economic paper n°1, http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file14774.pdf 
Nalebuff B. (2004): “Bundling as an entry deterrent device”, 119 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 159-188 
 21
Nalebuff, B. and D. Majerus (2003) "Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects. Part 2 - 
Case Studies", February, DTI Economic paper n°1, 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file14775.pdf 
Posner R. (1976), "Antitrust law: an economic perspective", University of Chicago 
Press. 
Reisinger, M. (2004), "The Effects of Product Bundling in Duopoly", Discussion paper 
2004-26, University of Munich, epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/archive/00000477 
Rey P. and J. Tirole (2005) "A Primer on Foreclosure," forthcoming, Handbook of 
Industrial Organization, vol.3, ed. By M. Armstrong and R.H. Porter, North Holland. 
Stole L.A. (2003): "Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition," Working Paper, 
University of Chicago, forthcoming in: The Handbook of Industrial Organization, III. 
gsblas.uchicago.edu/papers/hio-distrib.pdf 
Tirole J. (2005): “The analysis of tying cases: a primer”, Competition Policy 
International, Vol. 1, number1, Spring. 
Whinston, M.D. (1990): “Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion”, American Economic 
Review, 80: 837-859. 
